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INTRODUCTION
In a locked, windowless room with walls of corrugated steel, in a
restricted area of a Justice Department building in Washington, sits the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). Conducting proceedings
completely hidden from the public, as mandated by Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, the FISC grants government agents
permission to surveil targets if there is probable cause to believe they are
foreign powers or agents of foreign powers.' The FISC is accustomed to
approving each government request it receives, but on May 17, 2002, it
issued an order stating that the Department of Justice (DOJ) had
overstepped its bounds by promulgating surveillance procedures that
gave prosecutors too much supervisory authority over intelligence
investigations.2 The DOJ insisted that its procedures were in accordance
with the FISA amendments passed with the USA PATRIOT Act,3 and filed
the first ever appeal4 to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of
1. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 § 105(a)(3)(A), 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A)
(2000) (amended 2001).
2. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d
611 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct.), overruled by In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717
(Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. Review 2002).
3. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272 (to be codified in scattered sections of 8, 12, 18, 21, 22, 28, 31, 47, and 50 U.S.C.).
4. The appellate procedure in the case was complicated. The Attorney General did not appeal
the May 17 FISC decision directly, since that decision did not concern a specific surveillance
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Review, a panel of three senior federal circuit court judges appointed by
Chief Justice Rehnquist. The court handed down In re Sealed Case,
reversing the FISC order and affirming the legitimacy of the new DOJ
procedures and the USA PATRIOT Act amendments.5 In late March 2003,
the Supreme Court declined to reconsider the decision.6
The USA PATRIOT Act has virtually eliminated the specialized
intelligence-gathering function of FISA orders; they now can be used with
the specific purpose of obtaining evidence to be used in criminal
prosecutions, as long as this is not the sole purpose of such investigations.
7
Additionally, prosecutors and intelligence officials may now consult over
FISA warrant application and execution.8 A FISA warrant has become little
more than a regular Title III warrant 9 issued secretly with no required
showing of probable cause of criminal activity. In view of these significant
changes, the FISC retains little unique jurisdiction. The FISC's secret,
perfunctory procedures no longer provide constitutionally adequate
protection for surveillance targets who will be unknowingly investigated
and prosecuted as a direct result of its orders, especially now that FISA
surveillance may be used specifically for criminal-and not simply
intelligence-gathering-investigations.
The best way to revive the constitutional viability of foreign
intelligence surveillance is to forego the FISA warrant procedure entirely
and rely on regular Article III courts to guarantee the reasonableness of
such searches if challenged. Such a change in process would allow law
enforcement authorities more flexibility in pursuing foreign intelligence
investigations, since no pre-investigatory warrants would be required, but
would also allow for greater protection of the civil liberties of those
investigated, since the standard of review would not be simply whether the
target is an agent of a foreign power, but whether the search was conducted
in a reasonable manner, in conformance with the Supreme Court's Fourth
request. Instead, on July 19, the Attorney General submitted a surveillance application that did not
conform with the May 17 FISC order. The FISC, in an order issued the same day, modified this
surveillance request according to the May 17 order. The Attorney General then appealed the July
19 modification order, and also appealed an October 17 order modifying the government's
application for renewal of the July 19 application. These appeals were then considered jointly by
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review. See Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 729-30.
5. Id. at 719-20.
6. ACLU v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 1615 (2003) (mem.). Since there was no adversary
party in the FISC case, the appellate court permitted amicus briefs from the ACLU (in
collaboration with the Center for Democracy and Technology, the Center for National Security
Studies, the Electronic Privacy Information Center, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation) and
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. See Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 720. The
ACLU then attempted to intervene in the case on behalf of would-be FISA targets and obtain
Supreme Court review of the appellate decision, which the Court denied.
7. See USA PATRIOT Act § 218 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B)).
8. Id. § 504(a) (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1806(k)).
9. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000).
Title III covers federal surveillance operations not related to foreign intelligence.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
[Vol. 113: 179
Leaving FISA Behind
Amendment jurisprudence. Warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance
would be admissible in criminal prosecutions, but only if such surveillance
were determined to be reasonable in post hoc adversary proceedings.
My proposal is not to give the DOJ a blank check to investigate anyone,
anytime, anywhere; such a regime would cause the kind of backlash that
prompted the passage of FISA in the first place. Rather, if warrantless
foreign intelligence surveillance is going to succeed in the twenty-first
century, strict executive and legislative branch internal review procedures
are necessary. Prosecutors would have to give targets of warrantless
operations notice when such investigations are concluded, allowing targets
to contest the surveillance in Article III courts. Such a change would benefit
all parties involved. The DOJ would enjoy greater freedom in conducting
investigations, as it would not have to procure judicial warrants and could
act rapidly to investigate time-sensitive threats. At the same time, the entire
process would be removed from the supersecret domain of the FISC,
making the Attorney General publicly and politically accountable for his
orders, allowing targets more opportunities to challenge investigations, and
requiring Article III courts to closely examine the constitutionality of
warrantless surveillance when targets so desire.
In this Note, I first briefly discuss the reasons for the passage of FISA
and the establishment of the FISC, including the past and current workings
of the FISC as an institution and its questionable constitutionality even
before the USA PATRIOT Act amendments. I then explain how the USA
PATRIOT Act and In re Sealed Case have damaged the usefulness and
legitimacy of FISA and the FISC. Finally, I make the case for the abolition
of FISA and the appropriateness of warrantless searches as the standard in
foreign intelligence cases.
I. FISA AND THE FISC
A. The Jurisprudential and Political Foundations of FISA
Much has already been written on the fifty years of jurisprudential and
political wrangling leading up to the passage of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978,10 but a discussion of the reasoning behind some
of the key decisions is necessary to understand the current problems with
the system FISA created. The Supreme Court's first definitive ruling on the
10. See, e.g., Americo R. Cinquegrana, The Walls (and Wires) Have Ears: The Background
and First Ten Years of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 793
(1989); Robert A. Dawson, Shifting the Balance: The D.C. Circuit and the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1380, 1382-87 (1993); Gregory E. Birkenstock,
Note, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and Standards of Probable Cause: An Alternative
Analysis, 80 GEO. L.J. 843, 846-49 (1992).
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constitutional legitimacy of wiretapping came in the 1928 case of Olmstead
v. United States, in which the Court upheld a warrantless wiretap of
defendants' phones that led to the apprehension of a massive liquor
bootlegging ring." The Court refused to construe wiretapping as a search or
seizure under the Fourth Amendment, noting that no physical invasion was
involved. In explaining its approval of the search, the Court harkened back
to what it cited as the "well-known historical purpose of the Fourth
Amendment," which was "to prevent the use of governmental force to
search a man's house, his person, his papers and his effects[,] .. to prevent
their seizure against his will," and to avoid the "misuse of governmental
power of compulsion."' 2 In the Court's view, the law enforcement action in
the case at issue involved no such misuse of power, but rather mere
"voluntary conversations secretly overheard."' 13 But in the face of political
pressure, the Court would soon diverge from this interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment.
The Communications Act of 1934 made it illegal to intercept and
disclose any wire or radio communication,1 4 and the Supreme Court in
Nardone v. United States held that, accordingly, such evidence was
inadmissible in a criminal prosecution. 5 But as the specter of World War II
became more threatening and a joint congressional resolution authorizing
national security wiretapping stalled in the Senate, President Roosevelt
acted unilaterally and encouraged Attorney General Robert Jackson to use
electronic surveillance when "'grave matters involving defense of the
nation"' were involved.16 Presidents Truman and Johnson, as well as FBI
Director J. Edgar Hoover, continued this practice while retaining the
informal limitation on wiretapping to situations involving national
security.1 7 According to former Attorney General Edward Levi, between
1940 and 1974, federal agencies authorized approximately 8350 warrantless
wiretaps and 2450 warrantless microphone installations. 
1 8
11. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
12. Id. at 463. For more on this theory of the Warrant Clause, see infra text accompanying
notes 162-166.
13. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464.
14. Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 605, 48 Stat. 1064, 1103-04 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.
§ 605 (2000)).
15. 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
16. Cinquegrana, supra note 10, at 798 (quoting Electronic Surveillance Within the United
States for Foreign Intelligence Purposes: Hearings on S. 3197 Before the Subcomm. on
Intelligence and the Rights of Americans of the Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, 94th Cong.
24 (1976) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Attorney General Edward Levi)).
17. See United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 243 & app. at 246 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(MacKinnon, J., dissenting) (describing how warrantless national security searches authorized by
the Executive were commonplace until 1972, and appending policy statements of Presidents
Roosevelt, Truman, and Johnson to that effect).
18. See Cinquegrana, supra note 10, at 798-99 (citing Hearings, supra note 16, at 25-26
(statement of Attorney General Edward Levi)).
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As the practice became more and more commonplace, the Supreme
Court reconsidered the constitutionality of warrantless electronic
surveillance in the landmark case of Katz v. United States, where it held
that the government's covert microphone surveillance of a telephone booth
violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.' 9 The Court did an
about-face from Olmstead by holding that even noninvasive, non-
compulsory government surveillance could be presumed an unreasonable
search. The Katz Court used privacy as its hallmark for constitutional
reasonableness, holding that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places," and that "what [an individual] seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected., 20 In the
years between Olmstead and Katz, the Court had strengthened its view of
the warrant as a necessary constitutional protection for reasonable
searches. 2 1 The Katz Court accordingly held that warrantless electronic
surveillance was per se unreasonable, since its deliberate, pre-arrest nature
exempted it from any of the major recognized exceptions to the warrant
requirement (searches incident to arrest, hot pursuit, and consent).2 2 But the
Court backed away from its seemingly sweeping holding in a footnote at
the end of its opinion, where it explicitly noted that it was not ruling on
warrantless electronic surveillance when issues of national security were
involved.2 3 In a separate concurrence, Justice Douglas strongly objected to
the majority's national security exception:
The President and Attorney General are properly interested parties,
cast in the role of adversary, in national security cases. They may
even be the intended victims of subversive action. Since spies and
saboteurs are as entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment
as suspected gamblers like petitioner, I cannot agree that where
spies and saboteurs are involved adequate protection of Fourth
Amendment rights is assured when the President and Attorney
General assume both the position of adversary-and-prosecutor and
disinterested, neutral magistrate.2 4
19. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
20. Id. at 351-52.
21. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963); United States v.
Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951). But see United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1950)
("It is appropriate to note that the Constitution does not say that the right of the people to be
secure in their persons should not be violated without a search warrant if it is practicable for the
officers to procure one. The mandate of the Fourth Amendment is that the people shall be secure
against unreasonable searches .... The relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a
search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable.").
22. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357-58.
23. Id. at 358 n.23.
24. Id. at 360 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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Though relegated to the sidelines in Katz, the issue of national security
surveillance came to a head in United States v. United States District Court,
known as the Keith case, where the Court concluded that the government's
warrantless electronic surveillance of the target, who was accused of
bombing a CIA office, violated his Fourth Amendment rights even though
the surveillance was conducted as a result of national security concerns.25
Citing Justice Douglas's Katz concurrence, the Court held that executive
branch authorities were required to obtain warrants prior to conducting
electronic surveillance operations, even for national security purposes.
26
Just as the Katz Court shied away from the issue of national security
surveillance, the Keith Court twice explicitly acknowledged that its
insistence on warrants in national security cases only applied to domestic,
and not foreign, intelligence surveillance.27 In a somewhat cryptic passage
that would later be cited by courts considering the constitutionality of FISA,
the Court urged Congress to consider the issue of intelligence surveillance
with these precepts in mind:
Different standards may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment
if they are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of
Government for intelligence information and the protected rights of
our citizens. For the warrant application may vary according to the
governmental interest to be enforced and the nature of citizen rights
28deserving protection.
Notwithstanding this suggestion that warrantless surveillance might be
appropriate in some contexts, the Court's overall refusal to decide the issue
of foreign intelligence surveillance led to conflict among the circuit
courts-conflict that the Court has not resolved to this day. In the years
between Keith and the passage of FISA, the Third, 29 Fourth,3 ° Fifth,3 and
25. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
26. Id. at 317 ("The historical judgment, which the Fourth Amendment accepts, is that
unreviewed executive discretion may yield too readily to pressures to obtain incriminating
evidence and overlook potential invasions of privacy and protected speech.").
27. Id. at 308-09 & n.8, 321-22.
28. Id. at 322-23.
29. See United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 608 (3d Cir. 1974) (noting that the President
"must be aware of the posture of foreign nations toward the United States, the intelligence
activities of foreign countries aimed at uncovering American secrets, and the policy positions of
foreign states on a broad range of international issues," and that any searches for this information
were thus not "unreasonable," despite the possibility that the privacy of alien officials, agents, and
even American citizens might be infringed).
30. See United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 913-16 (4th Cir. 1980).
31. See United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973) ("[B]ecause of the
President's constitutional duty to act for the United States in the field of foreign relations, and his
inherent power to protect national security in the context of foreign affairs, we reaffirm ... that
the President may constitutionally authorize warrantless wiretaps for the purpose of gathering
foreign intelligence.").
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
[Vol. 113: 179
Leaving FISA Behind
Ninth32 Circuits all recognized a "foreign intelligence exception" to the
surveillance warrant requirement imposed in Keith.33 The circuits that
created such an exception used similar reasoning to that elaborated by the
Fourth Circuit in United States v. Truong Dinh Hung. Though the Keith
Court had deliberately not provided any specific guidance on the issue of
foreign intelligence surveillance, the Truong court used the Keith domestic
security balancing test to assess the legitimacy of warrantless foreign
intelligence searches. Under the Keith test,
If the legitimate need of Government to safeguard domestic
security requires the use of electronic surveillance, the question is
whether the needs of citizens for privacy and free expression may
not be better protected by requiring a warrant before such
surveillance is undertaken. We must also ask whether a warrant
requirement would unduly frustrate the efforts of Government to
protect itself from acts of subversion and overthrow directed
against it.
34
Applying this formula, the Truong court concluded that the unique
nature of foreign intelligence tipped the balance in favor of the government
and that Article III courts were not qualified to decide such sensitive
political issues. The court feared that the "procedural hurdle" of the warrant
requirement might foil attempts "to counter foreign threats to the national
security [that] require the utmost stealth, speed, and secrecy. 3 5 In addition,
the court opined that while courts are intimately familiar with the standards
of probable cause required for normal criminal warrants, "the judiciary is
largely inexperienced in making the delicate and complex decisions that lie
behind foreign intelligence surveillance. 3 6 The court noted that separation
of powers concerns led it to conclude that deference to the Commander in
Chief in the realm of foreign and military affairs was the most
constitutionally appropriate course of conduct.37
The Truong court noted, however, that this calculus would necessarily
change if and when an investigation transitioned from intelligence-
gathering to criminal, because "once surveillance becomes primarily a
32. See United States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 1977) ("Foreign security wiretaps
are a recognized exception to the general warrant requirement .... ).
33. Notably, the D.C. Circuit twice refused in dicta to acknowledge a separate foreign
intelligence exception. First, it held that the exigent circumstances doctrine would adequately
cover any emergency foreign intelligence searches. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 649-50
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc). Later, the court ruled that such an exception would only be acceptable
in "instances of immediate and grave peril to the nation." Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192,
1201 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
34. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1972).
35. Truong, 629 F.2d at 913.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 914.
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criminal investigation, the courts are entirely competent to make the usual
probable cause determination, and because, importantly, individual privacy
interests come to the fore and government foreign policy concerns recede
when the government is primarily attempting to form the basis for a
criminal prosecution. 38 This precept came to be known as the primary
purpose doctrine. Under this formulation, the Truong court held that "the
executive should be excused from securing a warrant only when the
surveillance is conducted 'primarily' for foreign intelligence reasons."
39
The foreign intelligence exception thus remained a large window for
totally unsupervised government surveillance. In the wake of the Watergate
scandal, Congress investigated whether it could formalize standards for
surveillance operations and crack down on over-intrusive use of warrantless
searches. The Senate's Church Committee, formed to study governmental
intelligence operations and chaired by Senator Frank Church, found that
government agents often had violated both Title III and the Fourth
Amendment rights of many citizens by conducting intelligence surveillance
without any legitimate basis or suspicion of criminal activity, much less
connection with foreign powers. The Committee determined that "the
absence of precise standards for intelligence investigations" contributed to
this phenomenon. 40 The Committee concluded, "[N]ow it is time for
Congress to turn its attention to legislating restraints upon intelligence
activities which may endanger the constitutional rights of Americans. ' '41
This was exactly what Congress did. After two years of revisions and
debates, Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978.42 The Senate Report on FISA offers evidence that Congress carefully
considered the relevant Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in formulating
the statute:
The departures here from conventional Fourth Amendment doctrine
have.., been given close scrutiny to ensure that the procedures
established in [FISA] are reasonable in relation to legitimate
foreign counterintelligence requirements and the protected rights of
individuals. Their reasonableness depends, in part, upon an
assessment of the difficulties of investigating activities planned,
38. Id. at 915.
39. Id.
40. 2 SELECT COMM. To STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, FINAL REPORT OF THE
SENATE SELECT COMM. To STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. REP.
No. 94-755, at 165 (1976).
41. Id. at 289.
42. Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783. For more details on the passage of FISA, see
Cinquegrana, supra note 10, at 806-12.
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directed, and supported from abroad b, foreign intelligence
services and foreign-based terrorist groups.
FISA was intended to provide the executive branch with judicial
supervision over its foreign intelligence surveillance operations that would
preserve the civil liberties of those being investigated, while at the same
time accommodating the flexibility, secrecy, and executive discretion that
the courts had noted was necessary in military and foreign affairs. It is an
imaginative and hybrid statute that designs an entirely new procedure for
procuring judicial authorization. Upon the foreign surveillance application
of a government agent, one of eleven FISC judges
44 must determine
whether or not there is probable cause to believe that the target of the
surveillance is a "foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.,
45 If U.S.
persons are involved, then the evidence submitted by the government must
not rest solely on First Amendment-protected conduct or speech.
46 The
court may not approve the surveillance unless the government proposes
sufficiently strict minimization procedures to prevent the use or distribution
of intercepted intelligence concerning U.S. persons.
47 The FISC judge does
not conduct the same kind of probable cause analysis that a normal Article
III judge would; he or she simply must determine if the FISA requirements
are met, and if they are, the warrant must be issued.
48 Thus the government
need not delve into the nature of the suspected criminal activity, as with a
normal criminal warrant. The main tasks are proving compliance with the
statutory framework and proving the identity of the target. This less
stringent probable cause standard dovetails with the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence on the issue, which, as we have seen, also turns on the
foreign-domestic distinction and the importance of executive discretion in
the realm of foreign affairs.49
43. SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF
1978, S. REP. No. 95-701, at 14 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3973, 3983 [hereinafter
S. REP. No. 95-701].
44. All eleven FISC judges also serve as federal district court judges. For the first twenty-five
years of its existence, the FISC had seven judges. The USA PATRIOT Act amended FISA to
provide for four additional judges on the court. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 208,
115 Stat. 272, 283 (2001) (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)).
45. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A) (2000).
46. Id.
47. Id. §§ 1801(h), 1805(a)(4).
48. Id. § 1805(a).
49. There are two exceptions to the requirement of FISC authorization: (1) The Attorney
General may surveil communications without FISC authorization if such communications are
exclusively between or among foreign powers, or pertain to technical intelligence under the
control of a foreign power, Id. § 1802; and (2) in an emergency situation, the Attorney General
may surveil any foreign intelligence communications for seventy-two hours before getting FISC
approval, see Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-108, §
314(a)(2)(B), 115 Stat. 1394, 1402 (2001) (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1805(0).
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After FISA's passage, judicial attention to the foreign intelligence
surveillance issue tapered off, as the courts trusted that the new statutory
framework would provide the necessary standards. The Truong court
acknowledged in a footnote that the "elaborate structure of [FISA]
demonstrates that the political branches need great flexibility to reach the
compromises and formulate the standards which will govern foreign
intelligence surveillance," and that as such, this was an area of the law from
which the courts would do best to shy awayi 0 FISA thus became the
primary mechanism for policing executive discretion in foreign intelligence
surveillance operations.
B. The Workings-and Failings-of the FISC
The FISC is the centerpiece of FISA. Because of its hidden procedures
and attenuated probable cause standard, the surveillance court has been
called "the strangest creation in the history of the federal Judiciary. '51 The
FISC's judges are charged with striking the delicate balance between
foreign policy and civil liberties; since the court operates behind a veil of
secrecy, it is almost impossible to assess their effectiveness in this role.
What little information is available might lead some to conclude that the
FISC has never been in the business of balancing. According to officials at
the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, as of July 2001, the FISC had
never denied a search or surveillance request. 52 Indeed, that perfect record
remains intact, as the FISC's controversial order in 2002 simply modified
the government's request instead of denying it altogether.53 This is
remarkable given that in its first twenty-three years of existence, the FISC
considered more than 16,000 applications. 4
It is important to note, however, that the government has had similar
success in the granting of its applications for warrants under Title III:
50. United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 914 n.4 (4th Cir. 1980). Though FISA
had not been passed at the time the surveillance in Truong was conducted, it was in effect by the
time of the decision.
51. JAMES BAMFORD, THE PUZZLE PALACE: A REPORT ON AMERICA'S MOST SECRET
AGENCY 368 (1982). Bamford describes the FISC as "the product of compromises between
legislators who wanted the NSA and FBI, the only agencies affected by the FISA, to follow the
standard procedure of obtaining a court order required in criminal investigations, and legislators
who felt the agencies should have no regulation whatsoever in their foreign intelligence
surveillances." Id.
52. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FBI INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS: COORDINATION
WITHIN JUSTICE ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CRIMINAL MATTERS Is LIMITED 3 (2001).
53. See In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F.
Supp. 2d 611, 626-27 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct.), overruled by In re Sealed Case, 310
F.3d 717 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. Review 2002).
54. For statistics dating from the FISC's inception, see Elec. Privacy Information Ctr.,
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Orders 1979-2002 (May 6, 2003), at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa-stats.html.
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Between 1992 and 2002, courts denied just four out of the more than
13,000 Title III wiretap applications they received. 55 The FISC is thus not
unique in its consistent approval of government surveillance applications.
Royce Lamberth, the former Chief Judge of the FISC, publicly attributed
the government's perfect record in the FISC to the "superb internal review
process created within the Department of Justice, ''5 6 which requires
personal approval of the Attorney General and the head of the requesting
agency on each FISA application, and often results in the submission of
forty- to fifty-page government affidavits to FISC judges.57 Indeed,
according to agency insiders, roughly three-quarters of surveillance
requests are initially refused by internal government review processes and
subsequently resubmitted.5 8 Lamberth also noted that numerous requests
made to the FISC are revised or withdrawn and resubmitted before
approval, and that no district or appellate court had ever reversed a FISA
order granted by the FISC. 59 James Comey, the United States Attorney for
the Southern District of New York, has stated that it is a misconception that
the standards for obtaining FISA warrants are lower.6 ° In most cases,
according to Comey, it is easier to establish that a target is involved in
criminal activity than to prove that the target is an agent of a terrorist
organization. The review process for FISA warrants at DOJ is "something
above probable cause," just as it is for Title III warrants, because the
government does not want to lose credibility with the courts and submit
applications that are not well supported.6'
Even if the internal controls on the submission of FISA applications are
as tight as government officials and judges say they are, the FISC's secret
procedures generate other significant problems. Appealing a FISC
surveillance order is virtually impossible in the current system since a
defendant might never know such an order had existed in his case or what
proof the government had submitted in support of it. For security reasons,
55. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS ON APPLICATIONS FOR ORDERS AUTHORIZING OR
APPROVING THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE, ORAL, OR ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS 30 tbl.7
(2003), at http://www.uscourts.gov/wiretap02/table7-02.pdf.
56. Benjamin Wittes, The FISA Court Speaks, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 19, 1996, at 21.
57. An Interview with Judge Royce C. Lamberth, THIRD BRANCH (Admin. Office of the U.S.
Courts, Washington, D.C.), June 2002, at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/june02ttb/interview.html.
58. Benjamin Wittes, Inside America's Most Secretive Court, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 19, 1996,
at 22.
59. Intelligence on the FISA Court, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 14, 1997, at 18 ("I have pen-and-
inked changes myself on the things. I have had things revised and resubmitted. I know other
judges have done the same, and these don't count as denials. We could probably, if we wanted to
play some games, create denials and then reapplications and grant those, and you know, play
numbers games.... We've just never done that.").
60. James Comey, Address to the Yale Law School Federal Criminal Investigations Class
(Apr. 25, 2003) [hereinafter Comey Address].
61. Id.
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defense attorneys typically are not allowed to inspect FISA applications
(although district court judges have some discretion in this regard).62 The
FISC is listed in neither The United States Government Manual nor The
United States Court Directory. Its proceedings are closed to the public;
even its location was initially kept secret, and the path through a number of
cipher-locked doors to enter the courtroom has been likened to something
out of Get Smart.63 The court holds almost no adversary hearings and issues
extraordinarily few public opinions or reports.64 Some have argued that if
more people knew about the FISC, there would be an uproar about its
seemingly antidemocratic procedures.65 One former National Security
Administration staff member who observed the FISC for several years in
the mid-1990s (and later became a defense attorney) stated in 1996 that
FISC procedures were wholly lacking in legal formalities, and remarked,
"There is little question that these judges exercise virtually no judicial
review., 66 It is unclear whether or not the FISC provides a genuine check
on applications for foreign intelligence surveillance, given that even Judge
Lamberth has acknowledged that the most extensive scrutiny of FISA
requests occurs within the Justice Department. It could be argued that the
FISC's primary role is not to exercise judgment in each individual case, but
to put a judicial imprimatur on each executive branch request it receives
that comports with FISA's statutory requirements-an inappropriate and
perhaps unconstitutional role for any Article III court.67
Indeed, numerous litigants have challenged the constitutionality of
FISA itself. The first major Fourth Amendment challenge to FISA
surveillance came in United States v. Duggan, where the Second Circuit
held that even though government agents are not required to show probable
cause of criminal activity to obtain warrants, FISA procedures as set forth
by Congress are a "constitutionally adequate balancing of the individual's
62. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f) (2000). This issue
has come up in the recent case of United States v. Battle, No. 3:02cr399 (D. Or. filed Oct. 3,
2002), where five accused terrorists have demanded and been denied access to the government
applications for FISA warrants used to obtain intelligence information that will be used against
them at trial. See Anita Ramasastry, Recent Oregon Ruling on Secret Warrants May Set
Troublesome Precedent, CNN, Mar. 18, 2003, at http://www.cnn.com/2OO3/LAW/03/18/
findlaw.analysis.ramasastry.warrant/index.html.
63. See Wines, supra note 58, at 22.
64. See BAMFORD, supra note 51, at 370.
65. See Gerald H. Robinson, We're Listening! Electronic Eavesdropping, FISA, and the
Secret Court, 36 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 51, 74 (2000); Dahlia Lithwick, Secrets and Lies: Seventy-
Five Little Reasons To Be Terrified of the FISA Court, SLATE, Aug. 29, 2002, at
http://slate.msn.com/id/2070287.
66. Wittes, supra note 58, at 1.
67. See infra Section IlI.A.
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Fourth Amendment rights against the nation's need to obtain foreign
intelligence information.,
68
Litigants have also filed Fifth Amendment due process claims in
criminal cases resulting from FISA-obtained information. Along with other
courts, the D.C. Circuit upheld the constitutionality of secret, ex parte FISC
proceedings in United States v. Belfield, noting that in FISA, as opposed to
Title III, Congress had emphasized the "need for the Executive to engage in
and employ the fruits of clandestine surveillance without being constantly
hamstrung by disclosure requirements.,, 69 The court also noted the
importance of in camera review of FISC applications in the delicate realm
of foreign intelligence surveillance, and the tradition throughout the circuits
of foregoing adversary hearings on such sensitive evidence in favor of
national security interests.7 °
First Amendment challenges to FISA have been few and unsuccessful
71
because of the explicit recognition in the statute that United States persons
may not be deemed agents of a foreign power solely on the basis of First
Amendment-protected conduct.72
Courts have summarily rejected other, more minor constitutional
challenges to FISA. Despite the fact that its judges sit for nonrenewable
seven-year terms, courts have affirmed the FISC's status as an Article III
court; since all of its judges are also federal district judges with life tenure
and fixed salaries, their term limits have not been determined to materially
affect the legitimacy of the FISC.7 3 Defendants have also alleged that FISC
judges are required to consider political questions when determining
whether or not to grant FISA orders. The Duggan court rejected this claim
by holding that the decisions involved in FISA applications are carefully
defined in the statute and are no different from the many "'findings of
68. 743 F.2d 59, 73 (2d Cir. 1984), affg United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180, 1185-
89 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (pointing out that before FISA, the consensus among circuit courts was that
no warrant at all was required for foreign intelligence searches); see also In re Kevork, 634 F.
Supp. 1002, 1010-13 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (noting the distinction set forth in Keith and in the
legislative history of FISA between ordinary criminal surveillance and foreign intelligence
surveillance), aff'd, 788 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306,
1311 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (stating that three circuit courts have held that no warrant was required for
foreign intelligence searches).
69. 692 F.2d 141, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
70. Id. at 149; see also Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 § 106(f), 50 U.S.C.
§ 1806(f) (2000) (providing that where a defendant moves to discover or obtain information
uncovered through FISA surveillance, the court may suppress such evidence "if the Attorney
General files an affidavit under oath that disclosure or an adversary hearing would harm the
national security of the United States").
71. See, e.g., Falvey, 540 F. Supp. at 1314-15.
72. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A).
73. See United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 791-92 (9th Cir. 1987); Megahey, 553 F.
Supp. at 1197.
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objective fact"' made in district courts. 74 Another, perhaps more salient
objection has been that the FISC violates separation of powers, in that it
functions in many ways as an arm of government agencies and the DOJ;
sworn to secrecy, sitting in a DOJ building, and ruling solely on
government documents with no adversary party, the FISC appears to have
less judicial independence than other Article III courts.75 But reviewing
courts have dismissed this claim out of hand, holding that the FISC "retains
,,76all the inherent powers that any court has when considering a warrant.
Lastly, the USA PATRIOT Act made several changes to FISA that may be
considered unconstitutional. The most significant of these is considered in
Part II.
C. Breaking Down the Wall
Before considering the necessity and legitimacy of the USA PATRIOT
Act amendments to FISA, it is important to assess the effectiveness of the
pre-USA PATRIOT Act FISA regime, and to determine whether it was
successful in its mission of helping law enforcement authorities prevent
foreign attacks against the United States while preserving the civil liberties
of surveillance targets. On the positive side, there is ample evidence that
FISA has led federal investigators to significant victories in the
apprehension of terrorists, even before the USA PATRIOT Act
amendments were passed. FISA surveillance was used in the detection of
those responsible for the 1993 World Trade Center bombings; in that case,
now-Chief Judge Mukasey held that such evidence was admissible as the
fruit of legitimately certified intelligence surveillance.77 Similarly, FISA
surveillance has been used to convict conspirators passing U.S. secrets on
to foreign nations, 78 and to detect numerous international terrorist rings.79
74. United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 74 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting Megahey, 553 F. Supp.
at 1196). Applying the factors set forth in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Megahey court
concluded that FISA does not require courts to involve themselves in political questions.
Megahey, 553 F. Supp. at 1197-98.
75. See Robinson, supra note 65, at 69.
76. See, e.g., In re Kevork, 634 F. Supp. 1002, 1014 (C.D. Cal. 1985), aft'd, 788 F.2d 566
(9th Cir. 1986). But see infra Section III.A (describing how any court's consideration of a
surveillance request might violate the Constitution's case or controversy requirement).
77. United States v. Rahman, 861 F. Supp. 247, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), affd, 189 F.3d 88 (2d
Cir. 1999).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542 (4th Cir. 2000) (East Germany);
United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067 (4th Cir. 1987) (Soviet Union); Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787
(same).
79. See, e.g., Duggan, 743 F.2d 59 (upholding the use of FISA to apprehend members of the
Irish Republican Army transporting explosives from the United States to Ireland for use against
the British Army); Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779 (N.D. Ill.)
(upholding the use of FISA to freeze the assets and property of organizations suspected of terrorist
ties), aff'd, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002), petition for cert. filed, 72 U.S.L.W. 3092 (U.S. July 3,
2003) (No. 03-46).
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But many law enforcement authorities argued that the pre-USA
PATRIOT Act FISA imposed restraints on the executive branch, forcing
investigators to jump through too many hoops in an area where their
discretion should be virtually unfettered. Much of this difficulty was caused
by the primary purpose doctrine, first established by the Truong court,
which restricted the use of FISA to operations conducted primarily for
intelligence-gathering purposes and established a "wall" preventing
communication between those conducting criminal investigations and those
gathering intelligence. The wall procedures were followed informally from
FISA's inception, were formally adopted by the DOJ in 1995, and were
required as a FISC rule of procedure starting in early 2001.80
But in a report on FBI intelligence investigations released just two
months before the September 11 attacks, the DOJ concluded that the
primary purpose and wall procedures had proved detrimental to a number
of operations. According to the report, it was common for FBI investigators
not "to notify the Criminal Division of possible federal crimes as they
feared such contacts could be detrimental should they decide to
subsequently seek the use of FISA tools."' 8' The report stated that such
concerns had affected FBI and Criminal Division cooperation in both the
FBI's investigation of the Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Aldrich
Ames espionage case.82 One commentator with experience in military
affairs remarked that FISA's "extraordinary procedures and high standards
of proof result in unnecessary investigatory delay, if not a bar" to important
intelligence investigations. s3
As times changed, the rigid FISA wall procedures became more
unworkable. James Comey recently noted that when FISA was enacted,
during the Cold War, primary surveillance targets were more easily defined,
as they were associated with distinct nations such as the Soviet Union.
Comey asserted that the wall procedures are more difficult to follow in
today's world, when FISA is primarily being used to prevent international
terrorism and detect amorphous, sprawling organizations with operatives
from all parts of the globe. 84 Comey described a somewhat absurd result
that the FISA wall brought about: Often different government agencies
would be conducting simultaneous FISA and Title III surveillance of the
80. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp.
2d 611, 619-22 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct.), overruled by In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d
717 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. Review 2002).
81. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 52, at 12.
82. Id. at 11-12; see also David A. Vise & Vernon Loeb, Justice Study Faults FBI in Spy
Case: Wen Ho Lee Probe Too Slow and Sloppy, Report Says, WASH. POST, May 19, 2000, at A1.
83. Gerald F. Reimers II, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 4 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. 55,
101 (2000) (providing a detailed analysis of the failings of FISA in the Wen Ho Lee case at Los
Alamos).
84. Comey Address, supra note 60.
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same target, without each other's knowledge.85 Mary Jo White, former U.S.
Attorney for the Southern District of New York, agreed, saying that "the
single most important thing impeding terrorism investigations was the wall
between investigating and prosecuting terrorism.' '86 White explained that
the wall procedures at times could have deprived government agents on the
trail of terrorists of valuable information, and in a complex investigation
such gaps in communication between different agencies could be fatal:
"You've got to put both sides of the Jell-O box together or you don't have a
prayer.
87
In her now-famous memo to FBI Director Robert Mueller, FBI Special
Agent Coleen Rowley expressed exactly this sort of frustration over the fact
that she and her fellow agents had not been able to obtain a FISA warrant to
search the contents of Zacarias Moussaoui's computer immediately after it
was seized-a search that she intimated would have yielded information
that might have prevented the September 11 attacks. 88 Rowley blamed this
course of events on fundamental problems with the FISA system: "[T]he
process allowed the Headquarters Supervisor to downplay the significance
of the information thus far collected in order to get out of the work of
having to see the FISA application through . ,89 Ironically, Rowley had
advised the Moussaoui team to seek a FISA warrant in the first place
because, though she believed there was probable cause for a criminal
warrant, "there is a common perception.., that if the FBI can't do
something through straight-up criminal methods, it will then resort to using
less-demanding intelligence methods."
90
Rowley paints a picture of a broken system---one where criminal and
FISA warrants were used somewhat interchangeably, with agents choosing
the latter when they felt they had a weaker case, 91 but where even the "less-
85. Id.
86. Mary Jo White, Address to the Yale Law School Federal Criminal Investigations Class
(Apr. 4, 2003).
87. Id.
88. Memorandum from Coleen M. Rowley, Special Agent and Minneapolis Chief Division
Counsel, FBI, to Robert Mueller, Director, FBI (May 21, 2002), http://www.time.com/
time/nation/printout/0,8816,249997,00.html [hereinafter Rowley Memorandum].
89. Id. para. 10; see also David Johnston & Philip Shenon, F.B.I Curbed Scrutiny of Man
Now a Suspect in the Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2001, at Al (citing a confidential source that
explained that the DOJ did not seek a FISA warrant in the Moussaoui case because "the bureau
and the Justice Department were under pressure from the chief judge on the [FISC] who had
questioned whether the government was being candid when it sought approval for intelligence
surveillance against people who were already the subjects of criminal investigations").
90. Rowley Memorandum, supra note 88, para. 7.
91. Federal government statistics indicate that in recent years, the number of criminal
warrants has declined, while the number of FISA warrants has increased. See Kevin Poulsen,
Record "National Security" Surveillance in 2000, SECURITYFOCUS, May 2, 2001, at
http://www.securityfocus.com/news/201 (citing ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT OF
THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS ON APPLICATIONS FOR
ORDERS AUTHORIZING OR APPROVING THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE, ORAL, OR ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS (2001)).
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demanding" FISA methods still sometimes proved to be too much of a
burden for agents to apply. The Moussaoui example makes it easy to
understand why law enforcement personnel and legislators alike would
want to abolish the wall. FISA was designed to create a rapid, efficient, and
constitutionally acceptable way of investigating foreign agents, but it
evolved into a bureaucratic tangle of formalities and procedures.
Why had FISA spiraled downward in this way? Did the original FISA
necessitate the wall procedures, or had they simply been improperly
imposed on the statute by the courts and then blindly followed by the DOJ?
If the former, then the statute would have to be amended in order to do
away with the primary purpose doctrine. If the latter, then the DOJ was free
to abolish the wall whenever it wanted.
In what turned out to be a prophetic report issued to Congress in 2000,
the National Commission on Terrorism suggested that it was within the
DOJ's authority to streamline the foreign intelligence surveillance process,
and that such reform was necessary for the country to fend off future
terrorist attacks. The Commission concluded that "[t]he Department of
Justice applies [FISA] in a cumbersome and overly cautious manner," and
that even though technically under the statute no evidence of wrongdoing or
criminal purpose is required to obtain a warrant, in practice the DOJ
required such knowledge before permitting an application to proceed to the
FISC.92 To alleviate this problem, the Commission recommended that
"[t]he Attorney General should direct that the Office of Intelligence Policy
and Review not require information in excess of that actually mandated by
the probable cause standard in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
statute," and that DOJ officials should cooperate with the FBI to ensure
more timely review of FISA applications.93
But no such changes were made, and as we have seen from the Rowley
Memorandum and the reports that support it, complications in the FISA
application process may have been one of the reasons the United States
failed to prevent the September 11 attacks. One commentator, enraged at
the bureaucratic quagmire Rowley described, advocated the "total repeal of
FISA," and remarked, "One would think that agents charged with
protecting us from a 'dirty nuke' would enjoy the same discretionary search
authority as a patrolman who makes a traffic stop. In fact, they have less."9 4
The FISA system was the product of a congressional compromise: a
balance between preserving defendants' civil liberties and preventing
serious crimes perpetrated by foreign powers and their agents. In attempting
to fill a void left open by the Supreme Court-which backed away from the
92. NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORISM, COUNTERING THE CHANGING THREAT OF
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM (2000), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/commission.html.
93. Id.
94. Mark Riebling, Uncuffthe FBI, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2002, at A20.
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sticky issue of how to regulate the Executive's powers in the foreign affairs
arena-FISA and the FISC were never heralded as ideal solutions. But until
international terrorism became a clear and present danger to the nation, law
enforcement authorities were content to use FISA procedures, even as they
became more and more complex with the refinement of the primary
purpose doctrine. After September 11, however, lawmakers were no longer
able to ignore the fundamental problems with the FISA regime.
II. How THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND INRE SEALED CASE HARMED
THE CONSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY OF FISA
Embedded-some might say hidden-in the USA PATRIOT Act is
section 218, four short lines that dramatically changed the nature of foreign
intelligence investigation and prosecution in America. 95 Under the pre-USA
PATRIOT FISA, when a government agent submitted an application for a
surveillance order, the executive branch official authorizing the application
was required to certify that "the purpose of the surveillance is to obtain
foreign intelligence information. '96 Section 218 of the USA PATRIOT Act
altered the language of the statute by substituting "a significant purpose"
for "the purpose., 97 This change applied not only to electronic surveillance
but also to physical searches of property, which were authorized under
FISA amendments passed in 1994.98 In effect, this amendment means that
the DOJ can now use FISA warrants to pursue nonintelligence evidence to
be used in criminal prosecutions. The wall has been torn down.
Undoubtedly, section 218 provides a quick fix to many of the
previously articulated problems with FISA procedures. But the amendment
creates more problems than it solves. Now that the FISC may consider
applications to pursue evidence to be used directly in criminal prosecutions,
section 218 has largely removed the unique quality of the cases the FISC
considers. In all cases involving potential foreign agents, prosecutors and
agents may now make an end run around the normal procedures required to
verify probable cause for criminal warrants. As criminal prosecutions based
on FISA surveillance increase, a growing number of defendants will be
convicted on the basis of evidence procured secretly and without any
95. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 115 Stat. 272, 291 (2001) (to be codified
at 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B)). It should be noted that section 218 and many of the other FISA
amendments have a four-year sunset provision and will terminate on December 31, 2005, unless
renewed. See id § 224. Republican legislators have already begun campaigning to repeal the
sunset provisions. See Eric Lichtblau, Republicans Want Terrorism Law Made Permanent, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 9, 2003, at B 1.
96. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 § 104(a), 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (2000)
(amended 2001).
97. USA PATRIOT Act § 218 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B)).
98. See id.
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governmental showing of probable criminal activity. Since FISA
applications are typically sealed for security reasons, these defendants will
be virtually powerless to challenge the legitimacy of any such evidence.
A. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court
The FISC, silent and wholly acquiescent throughout its first twenty-
three years, finally spoke out on these issues in an opinion written in May
2002, which was released to the public three months later.99 The FISC
opinion concerned proposed minimization procedures submitted by the
government for use in FISA surveillance operations. As mandated by FISA,
each government surveillance request must be accompanied by a
minimization plan, directed at reducing the probability that communications
involving U.S. persons will be used or distributed if intercepted. 00 In the
minimization procedures at issue, the DOJ gave criminal prosecutors access
to "all information developed" through FISA investigations, and authorized
prosecutors to "consult extensively and provide advice and
recommendations to intelligence officials" concerning "criminal
investigation and prosecution as well as the strategy and goals for
investigations, the law enforcement and intelligence methods to be used in
investigations, and the interaction between intelligence and law
enforcement components of investigations."' 1 These procedures were a
radical departure from previous DOJ wall procedures which prevented
prosecutors from supervising and guiding FISA surveillance with an eye
toward prosecution.' °2 The DOJ defended its adoption of these new
procedures by arguing that section 218 of the USA PATRIOT Act had
officially broken down the wall and allowed FISA to be "used primarily for
a law enforcement purpose."' 0 3 As further evidence that the wall procedures
were a thing of the past, another USA PATRIOT Act amendment to FISA
explicitly permitted consultation among federal officers about intelligence
information obtained through FISA in order to protect against terrorist
attacks. 104
Despite (and indeed, without extensively commenting on) the USA
PATRIOT Act amendments, Judge Lamberth, writing for the en banc FISC,
99. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp.
2d 611 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. 2002), overruled by In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717
(Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. Review 2002).
100. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h), 1805(a)(4).
101. 218 F. Supp. 2d at 622-23.
102. Id. at 619-20.
103. Id. at 623 (internal quotation omitted).
104. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 504(a), 115 Stat. 272, 364 (2001) (to be
codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1806(k)).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2003]
The Yale Law Journal
took issue with and modified these minimization procedures, arguing that
they impermissibly contradicted the 1995 DOJ procedures that mandated
the wall between prosecutors and investigators. °5 The court noted: "[T]he
collection of foreign intelligence information is the raison d'etre for the
FISA .... Clearly this Court's jurisdiction is limited to granting orders
for... the collection of foreign intelligence information .... ,106 But the
new procedures, according to the FISC, would cause intelligence
investigations to be subordinated to law enforcement objectives, as
"criminal prosecutors will tell the FBI when to use FISA (perhaps when
they lack probable cause for a Title III electronic surveillance).',
10 7
Much of this concern was spurred in part by what had become, as the
DOJ confessed, a trend of inaccurate and false FISA affidavits from FBI
agents, which according to the government resulted from collaboration
between agents overseeing intelligence surveillance and agents and
prosecutors overseeing criminal investigations of the same targets. 108 When
the government revealed some seventy-five such inaccurate affidavits that
were results of breaches of the wall, the FISC established a court rule that
required "all Justice Department personnel who received certain FISA
information to certify that they understood that under 'wall' procedures
FISA information was not to be shared with criminal prosecutors without
the Court's approval."' 0 9 Given its own institutional commitment to the
wall procedures, the FISC rejected the government plan and determined
that the procedures were necessary to maintain the integrity of the
intelligence-gathering process and of the court itself. The reasoning of the
opinion centered on past experience, previous DOJ policy, and the
inappropriate nature of the government's altered minimization procedures
in light of the primary purpose of FISA. Shying away from the
controversial issues underlying the case, the court explicitly declined to rule
on the broader-and much more crucial-questions of whether the change
in minimization procedures was legally justified by the amendment to FISA
effected by section 218 of the USA PATRIOT Act, and whether section
218 itself was constitutional.110
105. See 218 F. Supp. 2d at 623.
106. Id. at 613-14.
107. Id. at 624.
108. Id. at 620-21 ("In September 2000, the government came forward to confess error in
some 75 FISA applications related to major terrorist attacks directed against the United States.
The errors related to misstatements and omissions of material facts ...."); see also Lithwick,
supra note 65.
109. 218F. Supp. 2dat621.
110. Seeid.at615n.2.
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B. In re Sealed Case
The government appealed the FISC decision to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court of Review,' 1' which met for the first time in its history
to hear the case. The Court of Review came down rather harshly on the
lower court, saying that the FISC did "not clearly set forth the basis for its
decision," given that its main objection to the minimization procedures was
simply their conflict with previous procedures.' 12 The Court of Review also
stated that the FISC may well have exceeded its constitutional bounds by
unduly interfering with internal DOJ policies and procedures and providing
no ostensible constitutional or statutory basis for doing so.113 Holding that
the FISC's refusal to consider the legitimacy of the primary purpose
doctrine itself was error, the court then addressed the DOJ's main
arguments: first, that even before the USA PATRIOT Act, the wall
requirement was illusory and never had been required by FISA; and second,
that even if such a requirement had indeed existed, the USA PATRIOT Act
eliminated its relevance. Then, the court considered whether or not the USA
PATRIOT Act amendments comported with the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment. In a sweeping opinion that contradicted longstanding
interpretations of FISA across the circuits, the court questioned the wisdom
of the previously entrenched primary purpose doctrine and wall procedures
and affirmed the constitutionality of the amended FISA under the Fourth
Amendment. This holding is problematic in light of the significant
differences between FISC and normal Article III court procedures. In re
Sealed Case created a monster court with the right to adjudicate criminal
matters in an entirely secret setting, using less stringent standards of
probable cause, subject to no public scrutiny or adversary proceedings.
The court's statutory analysis of the issues focused on its claim that the
drafters of FISA did not intend to draw a line between intelligence
gathering and prosecution."l4 The legislative history on this issue, however,
is far from definitive; even the court acknowledged that support can also be
found in the committee reports for the assertion that FISA surveillance was
primarily intended for intelligence gathering." 5
111. See supra note 4 (summarizing the appeals process).
112. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 721 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. Review
2002).
113. Id. at 731.
114. Id. at 724-25 ("'Intelligence and criminal law enforcement tend to merge in this area."'
(quoting S. REP. No. 95-701, supra note 43, at 11) (emphasis omitted)). The court omitted the
following (and more equivocal) sentence: "The targeting of U.S. persons and the overlap with
criminal law enforcement require close attention to traditional Fourth Amendment principles."
S. REP. No. 95-701, supra note 43, at 11.
115. Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 725.
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Though the Court of Review (perhaps too boldly) alleged that the
drafters of FISA had not intended the wall to be an element of FISA in the
first place, the DOJ-as well as many circuit and district courts around the
nation-had subscribed to the Truong court's primary purpose reasoning
from the outset. The wall had been built, if not by Congress, at least by the
Executive and the judiciary.
The Eastern District of New York was one of the first courts to apply
the Truong reasoning in a case involving a constitutional challenge to FISA
surveillance. In United States v. Megahey, the court used the plain language
of the statute to justify the primary purpose doctrine, pointing out that FISA
itself required an executive official to certify that the information sought
was "foreign intelligence information" and not evidence intended for
criminal prosecution.'" 6 As noted by the Court of Review, the First,"
17
Second,'18 Fourth,' 19 and Eleventh 20 Circuits all followed the primary
purpose doctrine as described in Truong without in-depth discussion of its
merits.
Several courts, however, found the wall to be conceptually problematic.
In reviewing the Megahey decision, the Second Circuit affirmed the
primary purpose doctrine but also noted the practical reality of the situation:
"Otherwise valid FISA surveillance is not tainted simply because the
government can anticipate that the fruits of such surveillance may later be
used... as evidence in a criminal trial."' 21 Other courts had declined to rule
on the primary purpose doctrine in light of this often unavoidable overlap
between criminal and intelligence purposes in FISA investigations,
especially those concerning international terrorism.1
The Court of Review noted that the courts were not in universal
agreement on the primary purpose test, and blamed Truong for forcing the
government to subscribe to the so-called "false dichotomy" between foreign
intelligence information and evidence of criminal activity, when, according
to the court, the drafters of the statute had never intended such a result.
1 23
The Court of Review asserted that the primary purpose doctrine had
become entrenched almost by accident: District and circuit courts had
116. 553 F. Supp. 1180, 1189 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(A) (2000)),
affd sub nom. United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984).
117. See United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 572 (1st Cir. 1991).
118. See Duggan, 743 F.2d at 78.
119. See United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1075-76 (4th Cir. 1987).
120. See United States v. Badia, 827 F.2d 1458, 1464 (1 th Cir. 1987).
121. Duggan, 743 F.2d at 78.
122. See United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959, 964-65 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Kevork, 634
F. Supp. 1002, 1015 (C.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 788 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1986); cf United States v.
Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306, 1314 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (rejecting the Truong test because FISA
procedures, when followed, automatically legitimize the warrant, no matter the purpose).
123. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 725, 727 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. Review
2002).
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blindly followed Truong (an opinion that did not fully take into account the
ramifications of FISA, as its facts occurred before the Act had even been
passed), and the DOJ had followed the courts.
124
Justice Department officials have acknowledged that the wall
procedures, instituted formally in July 1995,125 were followed-often to the
detriment of important cases. 126 Whether or not the primary purpose
doctrine was legitimate in the first place, it had evolved into an important
part of FISA procedures. What little legislative history there is for the USA
PATRIOT Act points to the conclusion that many of the drafters of the law
were aware of this reality and intended to alter the traditional patterns of
law enforcement and formally break down the wall, as they believed it was
harmful to the investigation and prosecution of foreign intelligence cases.
The Court of Review cited floor statements from Senators Leahy and
Feinstein to this effect.
127
Despite the apparent jurisprudential and political consensus that the
primary purpose doctrine was at least an acceptable interpretation of FISA,
the Court of Review questioned the doctrine's fundamental assumptions
and condemned it as unworkable. In response to the Truong court's
argument that once FISA investigations become criminal, defendants'
privacy interests should take priority over foreign policy concerns, the
Court of Review emphasized that in many counterintelligence operations,
"the government's primary purpose is to halt the espionage or terrorism
efforts, and criminal prosecutions can be, and usually are, interrelated with
other techniques used to frustrate a foreign power's efforts. 128 The Court of
Review went on to point out that the Truong wall between intelligence and
prosecution "generates dangerous confusion and creates perverse
organizational incentives," and cited the testimony of an FBI agent that the
wall may have been a factor in the FBI's failure to prevent the September
11 attacks.1
29
The Court of Review concluded that "even though we agree that the
original FISA did not contemplate the 'false dichotomy' [of the primary
purpose doctrine], the Patriot Act actually did-which makes it no longer
false."'130 The court thus conceded that the primary purpose doctrine had
been followed in practice, whether or not the drafters of FISA had intended
124. Id. at 727-28.
125. See In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F.
Supp. 2d 611, 619 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. 2002), overruled by Sealed Case, 3 10
F.3d 717.
126. See supra notes 81-91 and accompanying text.
127. See Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 732-33. It is worth considering the possibility that the USA
PATRIOT Act was passed with such little deliberation that its drafters never considered carefully
whether the wall was a sufficiently entrenched concept to merit its statutory destruction.
128. Id. at 743.
129. Id. at 743-44 & n.29.
130. Id. at 735.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2003]
The Yale Law Journal
this to be the case. But as soon as it acknowledged the existence of the
doctrine, the court affirmed its destruction, primarily for practical reasons,
citing the difficulties it posed for investigators.' 31 In light of these
pragmatic concerns and its previously discussed statutory and
jurisprudential analysis, the Court of Review instead counseled the adoption
of a wall not between foreign intelligence gathering and prosecution, but
between ordinary crimes and foreign intelligence crimes, as the Keith Court
had intimated might exist, and as the Court of Review insisted Congress
had originally intended to create when it passed FISA.
1 32
In so doing, however, the court failed to consider the constitutional
justifications that led the Truong court to establish the primary purpose
doctrine in the first place. The court did not respond to the Truong Fourth
Amendment argument that if criminal and intelligence purposes were to be
combined in FISA investigations, regular Article III courts were qualified
to be, and indeed should be, the bodies to consider them. In fact, the Court
of Review spent very little time considering the constitutionality of the
USA PATRIOT Act amendments themselves. Rather, most of the court's
opinion focused on the original intent of the FISA drafters and the practical
necessities of law enforcement. The court did present a detailed comparison
of FISA and Title III warrant procedures, concluding that the two provided
virtually equivalent protections to targets. 33 Still, the court did not go so far
as to say that FISA procedures were definitely constitutional under the
Fourth Amendment. Instead, it cautiously noted that "to the extent a FISA
order comes close to meeting Title III, that certainly bears on its
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.'
34
At the end of its opinion, the court included a brief discussion of the
special needs line of search and seizure cases, which justify entirely
warrantless searches in "extraordinary situations."'' 35 Similarly, the court
noted that the purpose of FISA-to aid in the protection of the United
States from harm at the hands of foreign powers--distinguishes it from the
ordinary criminal context. 36 By juxtaposing post-USA PATRIOT Act
FISA with the special needs cases, the court seemed to be hinting that even
131. The Court of Review did acknowledge that it would be unacceptable for the DOJ to use
FISA with criminal prosecution as its sole objective, which would be in direct contravention of
the statutory language. Id. at 735.
132. Id. at 744.
133. Id. at 737-42. The Court of Review acknowledged that the standards of probable cause
were different, in that FISA did not necessarily require a showing of probable cause of criminal
activity for the target. The court concluded that this difference was not material in light of the
limited scope of FISA surveillance, which can only be directed at agents of foreign powers, noting
that "FISA applies only to certain carefully delineated, and particularly serious, foreign threats to
national security." Id. at 739.
134. Id. at 742.
135. Id. at 745.
136. Id. at 746.
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if the new FISA were not legitimate under traditional Fourth Amendment
standards, entirely warrantless foreign intelligence searches might find
constitutional validation under the special needs doctrine.
At the conclusion of its opinion, the Court of Review revealed its deep
uncertainty about the constitutional foundations of its own ruling when it
acknowledged that "whether Congress' disapproval of the primary purpose
test is consistent with the Fourth Amendment... has no definitive
jurisprudential answer," and that even if the USA PATRIOT Act standards
"do not meet the minimum Fourth Amendment warrant standards, [they]
certainly come close."'1 37 In effect, the Court of Review held that, one way
or another, with or without statutory warrants, foreign intelligence searches
were constitutional; to the extent that the new FISA "came close" to both
the special needs cases and Title III procedures, it was acceptable. Such a
holding is little help to those with a mind to reform the current system-or
to those who are unwilling to accept a system that merely comes close to
being constitutional.
III. A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
The USA PATRIOT Act amendments were aimed in part at
significantly expanding the government's capacity to effectively investigate
and prosecute terrorists under FISA.138 But in attempting to strengthen
FISA, Congress instead transformed it into a slightly watered-down version
of Title III that is, frankly, a conceptual mess. FISA allows warrants to be
granted in a hermetically sealed, secret context with a reduced standard of
probable cause. 139 At the same time, despite the government's perfect
record, obtaining a FISA warrant is not a piece of cake, largely because of
the rigorous process of review that FISA applications are subjected to by
DOJ officials.140 Once obtained, FISA warrants can now be used primarily
137. Id.
138. Indeed, Attorney General John Ashcroft has noted that the Court of Review's opinion
approving the USA PATRIOT Act amendments "revolutionizes our ability to investigate terrorists
and prosecute terrorist acts." Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Roundup: Opponents Lose
Challenge to Government's Broader Use of Wiretaps To Fight Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25,
2003, at A12.
139. It is important to note that some government officials have alleged that it can be harder
to get a FISA warrant than a Title III warrant in some cases, because proving that an individual
has ties to a sprawling, amorphous terrorist group like al Qaeda can be more difficult than proving
the likelihood that a potential target will commit a crime. See, e.g., Comey Address, supra note
60. But even if a FISA warrant is harder to get than a Title III warrant, the USA PATRIOT Act
amendments do make it possible for law enforcement agents to gather evidence for criminal
prosecution against someone without any showing that he is associated with criminal activity.
140. Even though such warrants are arguably easier to procure than Title III warrants, it may
still be a formidable task for agents to marshal evidence to convince their superiors that a subject
is a foreign power or agent thereof, as occurred in the Moussaoui case. See supra notes 88-90 and
accompanying text.
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for criminal investigations, as long as a token amount of intelligence
surveillance also takes place. The criminal investigations that result can be
nearly as sophisticated as those authorized under Title 111. "1
The FISA system that we now have is at the same time too strict and
too relaxed. The FISC's secret procedures and altered constitutional
standards no longer appear legitimate in light of the avowedly criminal
investigations that agents will pursue with FISA warrants. Perhaps if the
amended FISA provided extraordinarily effective and rapid ways to crack
down on terrorism, we might be more willing to accept its dubious Fourth
Amendment constitutionality. But as it stands, many of the pre-USA
PATRIOT Act bureaucratic obstacles remain.
Since the Supreme Court has declined to consider the FISA Court of
Review decision, at least for the time being, 42 an institutional response to
this constitutional dilemma should be developed. The best course of action,
which the Court of Review hinted at near the end of its opinion, is to
abandon FISA entirely and return to the days when foreign intelligence
surveillance was conducted without warrants and simply subjected to
general Fourth Amendment reasonableness principles. This, after all, was
the practice America followed for the first fifty years that surveillance
technology existed.
A. Case or Controversy?
At the outset of the discussion of how to reconceptualize foreign
intelligence surveillance, it is important to note the fundamental differences
between surveillance and garden-variety search and seizure. While search
warrants are ordinarily procured after a crime has been committed,
surveillance is intended to intercept and prevent crimes while they are in the
planning (or even preplanning) stages. Search warrants are initially ex
parte, but ultimately discoverable once executed; not so for surveillance
orders, which by their very nature must be kept concealed until surveillance
has ceased.143 The special nature of surveillance is relevant to the debate
141. The USA PATRIOT Act also expanded FBI authority to conduct roving FISA wiretaps,
USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 206-207, 115 Stat. 272, 282 (2001) (to be codified at
50 U.S.C. § 1805), to utilize pen register and trap and trace orders under FISA, id. §§ 214, 216 (to
be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3123 and 50 U.S.C. § 1842), to seize business records under FISA, id.
§ 215 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861), to disclose foreign intelligence information revealed to
the grand jury to other federal agencies, id. § 203(a) (to be codified at FED. R. CRIM. P. 6), and to
use "sneak and peek" warrants, id. § 213 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3103a), in addition to
expanding the scope of Title III to terrorism investigations, id. § 201 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2516).
142. The Sealed Case appeal having failed, see supra note 6, amici are attempting to
challenge the constitutionality of the amended FISA in a case in which surveillance has led to an
indictment. See United States v. Battle, No. 3:02cr399 (D. Or. filed Oct. 3, 2002).
143. TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 79-85 (1969).
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over the propriety of the USA PATRIOT Act amendments in general: By
breaking down the wall between intelligence and criminal investigations,
Congress conflated two very different processes that arguably should retain
their own procedures.
But the dichotomy between surveillance and searches has greater
implications. As Professor Telford Taylor has argued, perhaps surveillance
applications should never be considered in any sort of Article III courts, as
they are nonadversary steps in the investigative process, inappropriate for
judicial disposition. According to this argument, since no case or
controversy exists at this stage, courts have no business passing on the
legitimacy of surveillance operations until a genuine adversarial dispute is
at hand. Taylor suggests that until that point, "[t]he authorization of the
judge... is not an effective screen, and may serve as window-dressing, to
relieve the law enforcement official of responsibility for a decision which
should be his to make." 144 Under this view, both FISA and Title III warrant
procedures are illegitimate assertions of the judicial power in a permanently
nonadversarial context. They bury accountability for improper
investigations in judicial mystique, which is unconstitutionally applied in
the surveillance context when no case or controversy has yet arisen. This is
especially true in the FISA setting, where the entire process takes place in
secret, and the probable cause standard is greatly attenuated.
The solution, Taylor suggests, is to assign scrutiny of and
accountability for surveillance operations primarily to the executive
branch--"to concentrate rather than to diffuse responsibility. ' 145 This of
course was the policy the nation followed before Katz, Keith, and Title III
transformed the national surveillance landscape. And in the wake of Keith,
before FISA was enacted, it appeared that the courts would have no choice
but to formulate a workable regime of warrantless foreign intelligence
surveillance. The Fourth Circuit took the first stab by articulating the
Truong primary purpose test to attempt to confine warrantless
investigations to the intelligence context. The D.C. Circuit focused on a
way to police abuse of executive discretion. In United States v. Ehrlichman,
a case that concerned the criminal liability of those who orchestrated the
Watergate break-ins, the court warned: "The danger of leaving delicate
decisions of propriety and probable cause to those actually assigned to
ferret out 'national security' information is patent, and is indeed illustrated
by the intrusion undertaken in this case .... ,146 For a regime featuring
national security surveillance authorized by the executive branch to be
constitutionally acceptable, the Ehrlichman court counseled: "[T]he
144. Id. at 90.
145. Id.
146. 546 F.2d 910, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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personal authorization of the President-or his alter ego for these matters,
the Attorney General-is necessary to fix accountability and centralize
responsibility for insuring the least intrusive surveillance necessary and
preventing zealous officials from misusing the President's prerogative.' 47
As we have seen, however, instead of adopting the procedure the
Ehrlichman court recommended, Congress took action on its own and
passed FISA. In so doing, Congress may have neglected to consider
the inappropriateness-and possible unconstitutionality-of judicial
intervention at the surveillance stage.
In addition to these constitutional concerns, some have argued that the
surveillance mechanism is poorly suited to the warrant framework.
Professor Akhil Amar has pointed out yet another fundamental difference
between searches and surveillance: Search warrants are executed in order to
find specific evidence of criminal activity. Surveillance casts a broad net
that often yields information that is much more mundane-information that
is often voluntarily, if unknowingly, provided by targets. 48 This is the very
same distinction that the Supreme Court made in Olmstead v. United States,
when it distinguished wiretapping from forcible search and seizure.1 49 Thus
it is possible that the Court got it right the first time it considered the issue
of electronic surveillance, in Olmstead. The unique nature of surveillance,
as a nonadversarial element of an investigation, may make it inappropriate
for the judicial setting in the first place.
As we have seen, FISA is in a state of conceptual and constitutional
confusion; the statute is sorely in need of reform. In response to this need,
several alternative regimes for foreign intelligence surveillance begin to
take shape.
The first option is to do away with FISA altogether and conduct foreign
intelligence surveillance proceedings using Title III procedures. The Court
of Review did conclude that Title III and FISA procedures were
substantially similar;150 the natural response to this conclusion is to question
the justification for the continued existence of the FISC in the first place.
Why not simply collapse FISA procedure into Title III and eliminate the
supersecret FISC? As Judge Keith (of the Keith case) himself wrote in a
recent opinion, "Democracies die behind closed doors."' 5' Though this
147. Id.
148. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 803
(1994) (citations omitted).
149. See 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) ("The Amendment itself shows that the search is to be of
material things-the person, the house, his papers or his effects."), overruled by Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); see also text
accompanying notes 11-13.
150. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 737-42 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. Review
2002).
151. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcrofi, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2002).
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option would not solve the deep problems of the unsuitability of
surveillance mechanisms to judicial approval in the first place, at least it
would provide for a stronger probable cause standard and a more accessible
forum.
As the Keith Court remarked, Article III courts are more than capable
of handling the classified information considered by the FISC:
The investigation of criminal activity has long involved imparting
sensitive information to judicial officers who have respected the
confidentialities involved. Judges may be counted upon to be
especially conscious of security requirements in national security
cases .... Moreover, a warrant application involves no public or
adversary proceedings: it is an ex parte request before a magistrate
or judge.15
Particularly sensitive applications could be considered in camera, and all
applications could be sealed until surveillance was complete. The
mechanisms of normal Article III courts seem perfectly well suited to
handle even the most confidential information.
Additionally, since FISA surveillance appears to be moving out of the
intelligence realm and into the criminal arena, the intelligence expertise
justification for FISA's lesser probable cause standard and specialized court
no longer seems especially compelling. 153 Indeed, such expertise was likely
never a paramount concern. The Keith Court's commentary on this issue is
again relevant:
Courts regularly deal with the most difficult issues of our society.
There is no reason to believe that federal judges will be insensitive
to or uncomprehending of the issues involved in domestic security
cases. Certainly courts can recognize that domestic security
surveillance involves different considerations from the surveillance
of "ordinary crime." If the threat is too subtle or complex for our
senior law enforcement officers to convey its significance to a
court, one may question whether there is probable cause for
surveillance.
154
If, as the USA PATRIOT Act mandated and the Court of Review
confirmed, intelligence gathering no longer need be the primary purpose of
152. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 320-21 (1972).
153. There may be some value in the centralized, specialized nature of the FISC, but the fact
of the matter is that most terrorism cases today are brought in the Southern District of New York
and the Eastern District of Virginia, and many of the judges in those districts are just as expert in
foreign intelligence matters as FISC judges are.
154. 407 U.S. at 320.
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FISA investigations, then regular Article III courts are more than capable of
granting foreign intelligence surveillance warrants.
But such a course of action would doubtless bring a firestorm of protest
from the executive branch. The President would contest the imposition of
strict judicial supervision over foreign intelligence surveillance, pointing to
the Keith decision, along with his constitutionally designated role as
Commander in Chief'55 and the longstanding tradition of deference to the
Executive in the realm of foreign affairs and national security.156 The
Department of Justice would argue that submitting foreign intelligence
surveillance to Article III courts would hamstring its investigators in the
very area where they need more flexibility, and defeat the purpose of the
USA PATRIOT Act amendments. It is thus highly unlikely that legislators
would support a proposal to increase the bureaucratic requirements in this
context. Additionally, this option presupposes the legitimacy of Title III
itself. As discussed above, some would argue that surveillance should be
removed from the judicial context entirely-at least until the target
has contested it and transformed the issue into an adversary proceeding.
These practical and constitutional considerations counsel against a return to
Title III.
B. Rediscovering the Benefits of Warrantless Surveillance
The solution to this dilemma is to adopt a second alternative and return
to the jurisprudence that had been chiseled out by the circuit courts before
Congress stepped in and passed FISA. The Fourth Amendment has receded
into the shadows in recent FISA cases, as compliance with the statute has
been taken as the main touchstone of a legitimate search.157 But as the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review itself acknowledged, the
155. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
156. See, e.g., Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)
(noting that "[i]t would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should review
and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly held secret," and that
foreign affairs issues are "of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor
responsibility"); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)
(emphasizing the "very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of
the federal government in the field of international relations"); United States v. Clay, 430 F.2d
165, 171 (5th Cir. 1970) (urging deference to the executive authority where foreign intelligence
secrets are involved), revd on other grounds, 403 U.S. 698 (1971); see also William C. Banks &
M.E. Bowman, Executive Authority for National Security Surveillance, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1
(2000); Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs,
111 YALE L.J. 231 (2001).
157. See, e.g., United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 554 (4th Cir. 2000); United States
v. Isa, 923 F.2d 1300, 1304 (8th Cir. 1991); Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d
779, 790 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002), petition for cert. filed, 72 U.S.L.W. 3092
(U.S. July 3, 2003) (No. 03-46).
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statute has changed, and its constitutional foundations are shaky; 158 reliance
on the terms of the statute alone is not likely to guarantee that targets' civil
liberties are preserved. Faced with this situation, the Court of Review did
not certify the constitutionality of FISA on its own terms. Rather, it rejected
the Truong line of cases, which had painstakingly established the wall
between foreign intelligence and criminal investigations, and attempted to
justify the amended FISA procedures as roughly equivalent to those of Title
III, while simultaneously insisting on the distinctiveness of FISA
investigations. 159 This constitutional patchwork likely will not stand the test
of time. The wiser course of action is to repeal FISA and return to a regime
of warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance.
Under such a system, the government would not be required to procure
a judicial warrant before conducting surveillance of foreign powers and
their agents, but targets could challenge the reasonableness of the
surveillance in an adversary proceeding in an Article III court after the
surveillance was complete. In this regime, government action would still be
subject to the basic protections of the Fourth Amendment prohibiting
unreasonable searches; indeed, when considered in normal Article III
courts, such protections would likely end up being stronger than those
currently provided under the amended FISA. Signaling that reasonableness
is perhaps the most appropriate polestar for judging Fourth Amendment
constitutionality, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review
ended up affirming the constitutionality of the amended FISA because "the
surveillances it authorizes are reasonable."'
160
A wholly unregulated system of surveillance would be a hard sell to
legislators and citizens alike, since most Americans are accustomed to
reliance on the supposed protections of the warrant procedure, whether
those protections are effective in practice or not. Additionally, the nation
has tried warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance before with no
success, as the Church Committee findings made clear. 161 But now that the
FISA framework has crumbled, we are charged with devising a modem
framework for warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance that will
preserve the civil liberties of targets. This task is especially challenging
given the top-secret nature of many foreign intelligence investigations.
158. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 746 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. Review
2002).
159. See id. at 737-42.
160. Id. at 746.
161. See supra text accompanying note 40-41.
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1. The Traditional Reasonableness Standard
Prominent constitutional historians have concluded that a regime of
warrantless searches is actually the most faithful interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment, as the Framers intended it. In early America, it was not the
absence of warrants that citizens protested, but overreaching, general
warrants used as instruments for intrusive and abusive official searches.
162
When they wrote the Fourth Amendment, the Founding Fathers thus aimed
at both preventing "unreasonable" searches and seizures, 163 and guarding
against general warrants, issued without sufficient basis and capable of
being used to wreak significant havoc. The Framers did not intend warrants
to be prerequisites for reasonable searches, but rather the warrant was
nearly universally treated as "an enemy, not a friend. ' 64 The very phrasing
of the Fourth Amendment ("no warrants shall issue") indicates the negative
popular sentiment toward warrants. 165 As Professor Amar has pointed out, a
plain reading of the text of the Fourth Amendment supports this historical
reading: The Reasonableness Clause and the Warrant Clause are separate
and distinct from one another. For a search to be reasonable, the language
of the Constitution does not require the procurement of a warrant.1
66
Though this historical and textual analysis may be persuasive, the
courts by and large have insisted on adhering to the "warrant requirement"
that developed during the course of the twentieth century. 167 The Keith
Court itself adhered to this formula as it ruled that a warrant was required
for domestic security surveillance. There, the Court affirmed that "[t]he
warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment is not dead language," and is a
necessary component of a constitutional search.1 68 Part of the Court's
justification for this holding was that the exceptions to the "warrant
requirement" were "few in number and carefully delineated.' ' 169 Notably,
the force of this reasoning has certainly declined since Keith. There are
currently more than twenty exceptions to the probable cause standard, the
warrant requirement, or both.1 70 As Professor Amar has commented,
"Warrants are not required-unless they are. All searches and seizures must
162. TAYLOR, supra note 143, at 41.
163. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
164. TAYLOR, supra note 143, at 41.
165. See AKHiL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 69 (1998).
166. See Amar, supra note 148, at 761.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 10-24; see also Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S.
523, 528-29 (1967) ("[O]ne governing principle, justified by history and by current experience,
has consistently been followed: except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of
private property without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid
search warrant.").
168. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1972).
169. Id. at 318.
170. See Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1468,
1473-74 (1985) (listing exceptions).
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be grounded in probable cause-but not on Tuesdays. And unlawfully
seized evidence must be excluded whenever five votes say so."' 7' Justice
Scalia has written that the "'warrant requirement' [is] so riddled with
exceptions that it [is] basically unrecognizable,"'' 72 advocating a return to a
general reasonableness standard for Fourth Amendment cases.
17 3
In addition, the burgeoning line of "special needs cases" has signaled
the Supreme Court's increased willingness to forego the "warrant
requirement," the probable cause standard, and the individualized suspicion
paradigm, and to conduct a reasonableness analysis in cases where
important governmental interests are at stake. 1
74
The so-called warrant requirement has been eviscerated over the past
half-century to the point where its application is far from consistent or
predictable. A move to a general reasonableness standard would free judges
from a complex and tangled web of precedents and provide them with a
more faithful way of applying the Constitution.
2. Reasonableness in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Context
In light of the problems with warrant procedures in the foreign
intelligence context, this area of the law is particularly ripe for a
reasonableness regime. If such a framework were applied in these cases,
instead of questioning the fidelity of the surveillance to a complex and
contradictory statutory scheme in an ex parte setting, judges would be
assessing contested surveillance on its own terms as part of an adversary
proceeding. They would then be able to fulfill their constitutional duties as
Article III judges and hold law enforcement conduct to the standard the
Framers intended in the first place---one of constitutional reasonableness.
The foreign intelligence context is well suited to a warrantless regime
for a number of reasons. The DOJ has proven itself to be more than capable
of implementing stringent internal review processes to guarantee that the
only surveillance operations conducted are those for which there are
excellent reasons. Removing the FISC from the process would allow the
DOJ to move more quickly when time is of the essence, and give law
171. Amar, supra note 148, at 757-58.
172. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
173. Id. at 584 (Scalia, J., concurring).
174. There are dozens of cases in which the Supreme Court has declared warrantless searches
justified by special governmental needs. See, e.g., Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S.
444 (1990) (upholding highway sobriety checkpoints); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543 (1976) (upholding warrantless border searches for illegal aliens). The Court has declined to
uphold such searches in cases where the primary purpose relates to general crime control interests.
See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S.
32 (2000). The latter cases arguably would not apply in the foreign intelligence context, since the
Executive traditionally enjoys more expansive autonomy in foreign and military matters than in
routine law enforcement.
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enforcement authorities more latitude in choosing their initial targets, since
they would not have to formally establish probable cause that the target was
an agent of a foreign power. At the same time, the possibility of after-the-
fact reasonableness review of the merits of their decisions in Article III
courts (in camera or not) would help to guarantee calm and careful DOJ
decisionmaking. As a further safeguard against executive abuse of
warrantless surveillance authority, the Attorney General and the head of the
authorizing agency would each be required to sign off on all surveillance
operations, as they currently are under FISA, which would guarantee
personal and political accountability for any inappropriate surveillance.
Public accountability would play a greater role than it currently does under
FISA, as these two political figures alone would bear the burden of
certifying that all searches were reasonable; there would be no judicial
involvement to spread the blame. 75 Additionally, in order to provide teeth
to the accountability mechanism, the DOJ would be required to report all
ongoing foreign intelligence surveillance operations to the House and
Senate Intelligence Committees, which would be authorized to investigate
and publicly comment on any such investigations they found objectionable.
Removing the courts from the secret surveillance context is also
desirable from a constitutional standpoint: In a reasonableness regime, no
court would be required to assess an ex parte order that contemplated a
search of someone who had not been accused of any crime, so there would
be no case or controversy issue. Furthermore, the supersecret FISC would
be eliminated entirely; even though no court has declared its procedures
unconstitutional, there is something troubling about an Article III court
making important rulings, concealed from all forms of public scrutiny.
The aforementioned "special needs" doctrine might be an ideal way to
ease into a post-FISA warrantless surveillance regime. Without using the
terminology of "special needs," circuit courts deciding foreign intelligence
cases after Keith and before FISA formulated just such a standard when
they balanced the privacy interests of individuals being investigated against
the strong governmental interest in countering foreign threats to national
security. 176 Returning to this laradigm and integrating it into the modem
special needs framework would make what was old new again, and provide
a ready mechanism to abandon the warrant requirement for foreign
intelligence surveillance, leaving the FISA regime behind.
Though the foreign intelligence arena is badly in need of such a radical
change, certain features of sensitive surveillance cases complicate the
traditional reasonableness paradigm. As the D.C. Circuit noted in the
175. See supra text accompanying notes 145-147.
176. See supra notes 29-39 and accompanying text.
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Ehrlichman case 177  and as Justice Douglas warned in his Katz
concurrence, 78 if the executive branch is to be given expansive authority to
investigate criminal activity, some sort of safety net must be in place to
guard against abusive conduct. When proposing a reasonableness standard
for normal searches and seizures, Professor Amar suggested policing the
abuse of the warrantless regime by allowing defendants to file § 1983 or
Bivens actions for damages against government entities whose employees
abused their discretion and acted unreasonably.179 But such an enforcement
mechanism would be more difficult in the foreign intelligence surveillance
context, where many investigations have to be kept sealed for security
reasons. Surveillance targets might never know that they had been
investigated until they were indicted, and even then the government might
make a convincing case not to disclose the justifications for the surveillance
in open court.' 80 Or, perhaps worse yet, innocent targets might be surveilled
without any prior judicial approval, never be charged, and never have any
knowledge that their privacy had been violated. 
81
One possible way to modify the reasonableness standard to fit the
foreign intelligence context would be to require law enforcement authorities
to provide notice to every surveillance target once the investigation is
complete. Then, each target would have the option of challenging the
reasonableness of such surveillance in an Article III court through a Bivens
action. The judge would then conduct a normal Fourth Amendment analysis
of the circumstances of the surveillance undertaken. As there would be no
FISA warrant, there would be no sealed FISA application hidden from the
target, so if and when the government wished to conceal sensitive
177. United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910, 926 (1973); see also supra text
accompanying notes 146-147.
178. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring); see also
supra text accompanying note 24.
179. See Amar, supra note 148, at 812-13.
180. This happens under the current system as well. In United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d
542 (4th Cir. 2000), a husband and wife were surveilled for 550 days under twenty separate FISA
orders. They were convicted of conspiring to commit espionage and sentenced to seventeen and
twenty-two years in prison, respectively, almost exclusively on the basis of the information
gleaned from the FISA warrants. Pentagon Lawyer and Husband Sentenced for Espionage, CNN,
Jan. 22, 1999, at http://www.cnn.com/US/9901/22/spies.sentenced. Despite the best efforts of
their attorneys, however, the court never permitted them to see any of the government's FISA
applications, as the government had claimed they were sensitive documents, protected under 50
U.S.C. § 1806(f), which allows the district judge to deprive defendants of access to FISA
applications for security reasons. Squillacote, 221 F.3d at 553-54. See also United States v. Battle,
No. 3:02cr399 (D. Or. filed Oct. 3, 2002), discussed supra notes 62 and 142, where defendants are
alleging that Article III courts should have expanded ability to review FISA orders, and that §
1806(f) violates their due process rights.
181. It is important to note that this could also happen to a target of a Title III search, since
the USA PATRIOT Act eliminated the requirement of mandatory notice for targets of "sneak and
peek" warrants, which allow law enforcement agents to search an area frequented by the target in
the target's absence without his or her knowledge. See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §
213, 115 Stat. 272,286 (2001) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3103a).
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information about the search, it would have to approach the judge and
justify the reasons for such concealment.'8 2 Such stricter scrutiny of what
should be classified would likely lead to greater openness and more
extensive opportunities for targets, both criminal defendants and innocent
victims alike, to challenge the reasonableness of warrantless searches
involving them. A problem with this proposal is that some warrantless
surveillance operations would likely go on for years, and targets would
have no opportunity to challenge them until the invasion of privacy
involved had become enormous. But such is the fundamental nature of
surveillance-it cannot succeed if the target is aware that it is occurring.
Thus, it is better to provide the target with some substantive mechanism for
challen2ing the Fourth Amendment reasonableness of the surveillance than
virtually none at all, which is the current state of affairs.
3. Applying the Standard
It is important to keep in mind that if courts were to move to a general
reasonableness standard for the consideration of foreign intelligence
surveillance, some sort of consensus among the political branches would
have to be reached on the appropriate meaning of reasonableness. Congress
would have to acquiesce and trust in the reasonableness framework enough
to repeal FISA. The executive branch would be charged with all
preliminary determinations of reasonableness as it conducted warrantless
investigations. Congressional Intelligence Committees would be obligated
to object to unreasonable DOJ surveillance operations. When defendants
and targets challenged surveillance, the judicial branch would be asked to
apply its own conception of common sense and constitutional reason to the
situation, and provide the final word on the reasonableness of surveillance.
In such a regime, individuals at all phases of the system would be required
to consider and interpret the Fourth Amendment. Such continuous and
searching constitutional thought might well bring added legitimacy to the
foreign intelligence surveillance case law.
Of course, judges often differ in their opinions; a morass of inconsistent
reasonableness precedents could conceivably arise, complex enough to rival
the current catalog of exceptions to the warrant requirement.
Reasonableness is a complex concept not readily boxed in, but it is a term
no more difficult to construe than any other in the Constitution. Our courts
182. In the current system, there is almost no opportunity for substantive, public review of
the circumstances of the FISA search. According to the Eastern District of Virginia, "[Tihis Court
knows of no instance in which a court has required an adversary hearing or disclosure in
determining the legality of a FISA surveillance. To the contrary, every court examining FISA-
obtained evidence has conducted its review in camera and ex parte." United States v. Nicholson,
955 F. Supp. 588, 592 (E.D. Va. 1997).
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were created to help guide our endeavors to understand these words. When
a statutory regime is failing, better that we leave it behind, return directly to
the document the Framers handed us, and charge our judges with adapting
their words to our modem circumstances. Indeed, the Keith Court may
already have provided us with the starting point for this inquiry:
Reasonableness in the context of surveillance should be determined by
balancing individual privacy interests against the government's need to
fulfill its duty to protect the citizenry.1
83
CONCLUSION
In advocating for the repeal of FISA and the adoption of a
reasonableness standard in the consideration of foreign intelligence
surveillance cases, it may be instructive to consider a recent case where
such a calculus was actually utilized, and resulted in a thoughtful, well-
reasoned decision. In United States v. Bin Laden,'84 several defendants were
charged with the bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and
protested the warrantless surveillance of the Kenya home of defendant
Wadih El-Hage, an American citizen. The court ultimately ruled that the
Fourth Amendment contained an exception for foreign intelligence searches
performed overseas. FISA did not apply, as by its terms the statute's reach
is confined to searches conducted within the United States. 85 Thus, the
court was left with a clean slate on which to consider the issue of the
legitimacy of warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance, uncomplicated
by the complex statutory framework of FISA. The court chose to abandon
the warrant requirement in the overseas context and to conduct a
reasonableness analysis instead. In a discussion of the "costs of imposing a
warrant requirement, 1 86 the court mentioned the Truong and Keith
admonitions that a warrant requirement might 'unduly frustrate the efforts
of Government to protect itself from acts of subversion and overthrow
directed against it.',,' 87 The court also noted the special needs cases in
support of its assertion that a warrant requirement would be an "undue
burden" in the context of foreign intelligence searches abroad,' 88 and cast
doubt on the institutional competence of the judiciary to supervise
investigations in such cases. 189
183. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 314-15 (1972).
184. 126 F. Supp. 2d 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
185. Id. at 274-75.
186. Id. at 273-75.
187. Id. at 274 (quoting United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. at 315).
188. Id.
189. See id.
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In light of these considerations, the court formulated an exception to the
warrant requirement, "narrowly drawn" to cover only overseas searches.' 90
Notably, the court also built a primary purpose test into its framework,
citing Truong and United States v. Butenko to emphasize that such
surveillance would be illegal if unrelated to the "'foreign affairs needs of a
President.' ' 191 Having returned to pre-FISA case law to form the basis of its
ruling, the court then used a Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis to
consider the defendant's claim that the electronic surveillance of his home
was of such a long duration as to be unreasonable. Inquiry into the specific
facts and circumstances of the case, informed by the relevant precedents,
led the court to conclude that the surveillance was reasonable.1 92
The Bin Laden court may have struck a visionary pose when it decided
to favor a regime of warrantless searches policed by Fourth Amendment
reasonableness analysis. Such a policy has the potential to improve the
current state of affairs for all parties involved. Law enforcement authorities
would have greater flexibility and freedom to pursue foreign intelligence
investigations. At the same time, a renewed focus on Fourth Amendment
principles would potentially increase protection of the civil liberties of
surveillance targets.
Perhaps unknowingly, the DOJ may already be pushing domestically
conducted foreign intelligence operations in the direction of warrantless
surveillance. FISA contains an exception allowing the Attorney General to
authorize foreign intelligence surveillance for up to seventy-two hours
without FISC approval in an emergency situation.1 93 This time period was
increased from twenty-four hours in the wake of September 11.194 Attorney
General John Ashcroft recently revealed to Congress that he approved more
than 170 such warrants in 2002, three times the number used throughout the
entire previous twenty-three years. 195 Ashcroft commented that the DOJ's
increased usage of emergency FISA procedures is one of the reasons there
have been no further terrorist attacks in America since September 11.196
Ashcroft's comment supports the contention that a warrant-free
procedure might allow for increased law enforcement effectiveness. At the
same time, if such surveillance were conducted without complex, secret
FISA procedures at their roots, targets would be better able to challenge
them after the fact in normal Article III courts on Fourth Amendment
190. Id. at 277.
191. Id. at 278 (quoting United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 606 (3d Cir. 1974)).
192. See id. at 285-86.
193. See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-108, §
314(a)(2)(B), 115 Stat. 1394, 1402 (2001) (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1805(f)).
194. See id.
195. Ashcroft Accelerates Use of Emergency Spy Warrants, CNN, Mar. 24, 2003, at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/O3/24/spy.powers.ap.
196. Id.
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reasonableness grounds. The repeal of FISA, though it sounds dramatic,
would not be a drastic change. It would simply effectuate the nation's
return to its previous tradition of executive discretion in foreign affairs,
while at the same time allowing normal Article III courts to reclaim their
rightful role in adjudicating the Fourth Amendment reasonableness of
foreign intelligence and criminal surveillance. The struggle between
executive discretion and individual liberties has long plagued the foreign
intelligence surveillance debate. As justification for executive authority in
this regard, some have cited the Machiavellian idea that "at times it is
necessary to do admittedly evil things for the preservation and welfare of
the political community."' 197 We need not be obliged, however, to do evil in
order to protect ourselves from foreign threats; instead, we need only return
to the text and fundamental principles of the Fourth Amendment, allowing
the Constitution both to safeguard the liberties of criminal defendants
and to guide law enforcement agents in their efforts to protect the nation
from harm.
197. Martin S. Sheffer, Nixon, Mitchell, and Warrantless Wiretaps: A Presidential Attempt
To Suspend the Fourth Amendment, 16 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 637, 660 (1989); see also NICCOLO
MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 67 (Angelo M. Codevilla ed. & trans., Yale Univ. Press 1997) (1532)
("[A] prince... cannot observe all those things by which men are considered good, it often being
necessary to maintain the state, to operate against faith, against charity, against humaneness,
against religion. And therefore it is necessary .. not to depart from good when he can, but to
know how to enter into evil when he needs to.").
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